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The debate on the existence of free will is on-going. Seminal ﬁndings by Libet et al.
(1983) demonstrate that subjective awareness of a voluntary urge to act (theW-judgment)
occurs before action execution. Libet’s paradigm requires participants to perform voluntary
actions while watching a clock hand rotate. On response trials, participants make a
retrospective judgment related to awareness of their urge to act.This research investigates
the relationship between individual differences in performance on the Libet task and
self-awareness. We examined the relationship between W-judgment, attributional style
(AS; a measure of perceived control) and interoceptive sensitivity (IS; awareness of
stimuli originating from one’s body; e.g., heartbeats). Thirty participants completed the
AS questionnaire (ASQ), a heartbeat estimation task (IS), and the Libet paradigm. The
ASQ score signiﬁcantly predicted performance on the Libet task, while IS did not –
more negative ASQ scores indicated larger latency between W-judgment and action
execution. A signiﬁcant correlation was also observed between ASQ score and IS. This is
the ﬁrst research to report a relationship between W-judgment and AS and should inform
the future use of electroencephalography (EEG) to investigate the relationship between
AS,W-judgment and RP onset. Our ﬁndings raise questions surrounding the importance of
one’s perceived control in determining the point of conscious intention to act. Furthermore,
we demonstrate possible negative implications associated with a longer period between
conscious awareness and action execution.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of free will has long been a controversial topic in
both philosophical and scientiﬁc domains (Sinnott-Armstrong
and Nadel, 2011). Here free will, or volitional action, is deﬁned
as conscious awareness of the intention to act. The traditional
concept of free will (control of one’s actions) has been challenged
by the research of Libet et al. (1983); whose results show onset
of neural activity associated with an action before an individ-
ual becomes aware of their intention to act. In their seminal
experiment, Libet et al. (1983) used EEG to record the readi-
ness potentials (RP) of six participants while they completed a
computer task. During the task, participants were asked to watch
a clock hand rotate around a clock and to press a button only
if they felt the urge to act (to emphasize voluntary action). If
a response was made during a given trial, the participant was
asked to indicate the position of the clock hand when they ﬁrst
became aware of the urge to move (known as the W-judgment).
The RP (or Bereitschaftspotential) is characterized by a slow neg-
ative shift in potential related to the motor and pre-motor area
(Luder Deecke and Kornhuber, 1969) and is often seen before
voluntary movements (for example, Waszak et al., 2005; for alter-
native explanations see Schurger et al., 2012). Libet et al. (1983)
showed that, on average, an RP was seen 550 ms before action
initiation while W-judgments were seen 206 ms before action ini-
tiation (−206 ms). Therefore, Libet et al. (1983) suggested that
action intention is not entirely “free” and that conscious aware-
ness may occur as more of a justiﬁcation of a predetermined
action.
Libet (1999) later argued that these ﬁndings do not necessar-
ily negate the concept of volition, rather the phenomenon may
exist in the period between awareness of the urge to act and action
execution. Speciﬁcally, Libet (1999) suggested that 200 ms latency
between awareness and action execution could allow for conscious
inhibition of that action if required. This latency is known as the
“veto” period and is used to provide a more observable notion
of volition (Haggard and Libet, 2001; Mele, 2008). While the
Libet paradigm has been subject to criticism (see Haggard et al.,
2002), research accounting for issues related to task constraints
(Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008; RP’s 1.42 s prior to action onset)
and subjective report (Fried et al., 2011; activity seen 700 ms prior
to action onset in single-cell recordings) still replicate the basic
ﬁndings of Libet’s work. However, the precise timing of associated
neural activation is disputed (for more replications see, Lau et al.,
2004; Soon et al., 2008).
In spite of the wealth of research into the Libet paradigm, the
inﬂuence of individual differences in response patterns on the
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Libet task is relatively unknown. Libet et al. (1983) did take indi-
vidual differences in response patterns into account (by creating
a discrepancy score between a participants average W-judgment
and the average time of perceived external touch, determined
by another task) in the hope of providing a more reliable esti-
mate of awareness of intention to act, but did not consider other
inter-individual differences (e.g., personality). Haggard and Eimer
(1999) also addressed variance in W-judgments by investigating
variance within a participant’s W-judgments and the covariance
of associated brain activity (namely, the RP and lateralised RP; a
potential calculated by investigating the relative shift in activity
between the contralateral and ipsilateral hemisphere to the hand
performing the action). They suggest that LRP onset covaries with
time of W-judgments in that early W-judgments correlate with
early LRP onset and late W-judgments correlate with late LRP
onset. In this way, it is clear that research into volition is aware
of potential individual differences in the W-judgment. The cur-
rent research aims to investigate the relationship between aspects
of self-awareness (IS, one’s awareness of one’s internal stimuli),
perceived control (AS; the style one uses to explain life events)
and one’s awareness of one’s intention to act. To our knowledge
this is the ﬁrst research investigating personality and perceptual
correlates of W-judgments on the Libet task.
Attributional style (AS) refers to the style an individual uses to
explain previous positive and negative life events. Peterson et al.
(1982) developed the AS Questionnaire (ASQ) to measure per-
ceived control across several modalities. In order to enable a more
holistic understanding of an individual’s perception of control to
be established, the ASQ attempts to deﬁne the style that individ-
uals adopt to explain life events across three areas; (1) Internality
(whether the individual feels the cause of the event is due to them-
selves or an external factor), (2) Stability (whether the individual
feels this cause is stable over time), and (3) Globality (whether
the individual feels the cause will be present across multiple life
domains). Those who view the cause of positive life events as
internal, stable and global, and the cause of negative life events as
external, transient, and speciﬁc are said to have a positive or opti-
mistic AS; while those who view the cause of positive life events
as external, transient, and speciﬁc, and the cause of negative life
events as internal, stable and global are thought to have a nega-
tive or pessimistic AS. Many beneﬁts of having an optimistic AS
have been reported in the literature, such as higher levels of well-
being in comparison to those with a negative AS (see Forgeard
and Seligman, 2012 for a review). Research into negative AS is
more extensive (Seligman et al., 1999; Seligman, 2002) with many
reporting a relationship between depression (e.g., Peterson et al.,
1982; Stange et al., 2013) and anxiety (e.g., Luten et al., 1997; Mark
and Smith, 2012) and negative AS scores. Furthermore research
has also shown negative feelings and emotions to correlate with
other measures. For example, Critchley et al. (2004) show a pos-
itive relationship between “negative emotional experience” and
IS.
Interoception refers to one’s awareness of one’s internal stimuli
(e.g., an individual’s ability to estimate their own heartbeats over
a given time period, Craig, 2002). The somatic-marker hypothesis
proposed by Damasio et al. (1996) suggests that emotional and
physiological changes elicited by exposure to certain situations
or stimuli are bound together. Therefore, when encountering a
new stimulus that elicits the same physical arousal/emotion, the
individual will evaluate the potential reward or punishment based
on prior experience. Werner et al. (2013) supports this theory by
showing that increased interoceptive awareness relates to increased
processing of somatic markers during a decision making task.
Craig (2004) suggests this integration of interoceptive and emo-
tion information occurs within a neural network converging in
the insular cortex. Furthermore, he later suggests that integra-
tion of this information occurs at each moment in time to create a
global, time-locked, sense of self-awareness (Craig, 2010). Relating
this to the current research, work by Berlucchi and Aglioti (2010)
demonstrate that similar cortical regions, primarily the Insula, are
associated with both interoception and agency (a sense of control
over one’s actions). In this context, one may expect a relationship
between performances on the Libet task, AS and IS in the current
study.
There is evidence to suggest that perceived control and belief in
free will are related, with Baumeister and Brewer (2012) demon-
strating a positive correlation between internal Locus of Control
(attribution of the cause of life events to the self; LOC; Rotter,
1966) and belief in free will. Furthermore, Stroessner and Green
(1990) demonstrate a positive correlation between beliefs in deter-
minism and external LOC (attribution of the cause of life events
to external factors). Supporting this, Paulhus and Carey (2011)
demonstrate a positive correlation between belief in free will and
AS (one’s style of explaining life events; a measure of perceived
control). As well as this, Orellana-Damacela et al. (2000) suggest
that, when more self-aware, one is more likely to consult one’s own
standards and beliefs during decision-making. It is proposed that
this act can be beneﬁcial or detrimental to the individual in ques-
tion based on their ability to meet their own expectations. This
suggests that individual differences in levels of self-awareness can
have varying effects on cognition based on top-down factors such
as perceived control and decision making. However, little is known
about the relationship betweenone’s conscious awareness of inten-
tion to act and one’s perceived control over life events. Rigoni et al.
(2011) attempt to address this issue by investigating the neural
correlates associated with manipulating belief in free will. Partici-
pants who read a passage of text negating the concept of free will
showed decreased RP amplitude, but not W-judgment latency,
during the Libet task in comparison to those who read a neu-
tral passage of text. Rigoni et al.’s (2011) work demonstrates the
relationship between neural activity associated with action execu-
tion and higher level beliefs while demonstrating the malleability
of both. However, it is still unclear to what extent pre-existing
perceptions of control and awareness of conscious intention to
act are related. Therefore, the current research aims to investigate
how individual differences in perceived control and self-awareness
correlate with one another and with awareness of intention to act.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
ETHICAL APPROVAL
Prior to data collection, ethical approval was granted by Ban-
gor University’s Ethics Board. All participants were recruited
via the universities recruitment site and were offered printer
credits or course credits as compensation for taking part. Written
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consent was obtained from all participants before beginning the
experiment.
TRIALS AND PROCEDURE
A repeated measures design was used to allow for correlational
data analysis and to reduce inter-subject variance. Analysis con-
sisted of a multiple regression to assess whether AS and IS
predicted performance on the Libet task. A separate correlation
was run using Interoceptive sensitivity scores and AS scores. All
tasks (clock, questionnaire, and heart-rate) were counterbalanced
across participants.
Clock task
The stimuli used were similar to that of Libet et al. (1983), con-
sisting of a black clock hand rotating around a clock-like object
on a white background (stimuli remained on screen during inter-
trial intervals). The clock hand disappeared during the judgment
part of the task (see Procedure). During each trial the clock hand
rotated around the clock 3 times (2 s per rotation, 6 s in total).
The hand completed three full rotations for every trial (includ-
ing response trials) to prevent the stop position of the hand from
inﬂuencing theW-judgment. Participants were instructed to allow
one full rotation of the clock hand around the clock and to click
the mouse at any point during the ﬁnal two rotations if they felt
the urge to do so. On response trials, following three rotations
of the clock hand, the clock hand disappeared and a question
mark appeared in the middle of the screen. The participant was
instructed to use the mouse to make a retrospective judgment of
when they ﬁrst became aware of the urge to act. “Using the mouse,
please mark the point on the clock that the clock hand was at
when you ﬁrst became aware of the urge to act.” The next trial
began once a mouse click was detected. Trials where no response
occurred were excluded from the ﬁnal analysis. There were 60 tri-
als during the task but, due to the voluntary nature, there was
variation in the number of trials included for each individual.
Interoceptive sensitivity task
Participants’ heart beat estimates were recorded as well as actual
heart beats using an electrocardiogram (electrodes were attached
to both wrists and one ankle of the participant). The task con-
sisted of six blocks of varying length (35 s, 45 s, 100 s, repeated)
in a randomized order across participants to allow for reliable and
varied estimates between participants. Intervals between blocks
also varied in length (75 s, 65 s, 55 s and immediate start) –
these were also randomized across participants. Participants were
instructed to count their heart beats to the best of their ability
without taking their pulse. Participants were instructed to close
their eyes throughout the experiment and to count their heart-
beats to the best of their ability without taking their pulse. Upon
hearing a single tone, they were to start counting, upon hearing
two short tones; they were required to verbally report the number
of heartbeats they had counted.
ASQ
Participants were required to answer the 12 items on the ASQ.
Each item consisted of a scenario (for example, “You meet a friend
who acts hostilely toward you”) followed by four questions (one
qualitative – “Write down one major cause for this event”) – the
questions were the same for all items. The participant was required
to give an example of one major cause for the scenario and to rate
this cause across three, 7-point, likert scales to assess internality
(“Is this cause due to something about you or to something about
other people or circumstances?”), stability (“In the future, will this
cause again be present?”) and globality, respectively (“Is the cause
unique to this situation or does it also inﬂuence other areas of your
life?”).
DATA ANALYSIS
Clock task
Only data from response trials was included in the analysis. If
number of response trials were more than 2 SD away from the
mean, that participant’s datawas excluded fromanalysis. The angle
of the clock-hand on the clockwhen the participantmade a button
press was recorded as well as the angle the mouse was at during
the judgment phase of the task. Both angles were converted into
time by dividing the angle score by π. To obtain the difference
scores, the time of action was taken from the W-judgment time
to produce a negative number. Therefore, the closer the difference
score was to 0, the smaller the distance between action execution
and W-judgment.
Interoceptive sensitivity task
The following formula was used to calculate an average accuracy
score (scores were summed for all six trials prior to entry into the
formula):
∑
1−
[ |Recorded Heartbeats − Counted Heartbeats|
Recorded Heartbeats
]
This was then multiplied by 100 to give a percentage accu-
racy score. Participants who provided more accurate estimates
had a higher accuracy score thought to be indicative of better
interoceptive sensitivity (Schandry, 1981).
ASQ
It is worth noting that the questionnaire’s subscale reliability is
low (internality, r = 0.54; stability, r = 0.65, globality; r = 0.59;
Peterson et al., 1982), however, when compounding the scales
together, the reliability is vastly improved (positive AS, r = 0.75,
negative AS, r = 0.72). As we were concerned with a holistic
representation of perceived control, we analyzed response on the
questionnaire by taking an average across all the scales for positive
and negative questions, respectively. To obtain an overall AS score
for each participant, scores from all three subscales for each of the
six questions with a positive valence were summed and divided
by 18, the same was done for the six questions with a negative
valence. The negative composite score was then taken from the
positive composite score to obtain an overall composite score of
attributional style. Higher scores were indicative of a more posi-
tive AS (more likely to attribute positive events to internal, stable,
global attributes, andnegative events to external, transient, speciﬁc
attributes).
RESULTS
Three participants were removed due to incomplete data on the
heartbeat task (electrode recordings were too noisy) and two
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participants were removed due to outlier data (one for only com-
pleting six trials on the Libet task, and 1 because of an average
W-judgment further than 2 SD from the group mean). Due to the
voluntary nature of the Libet task, the number of trials completed
varied between participants (responses M = 45.84, SD = 12.91).
Data for 25 participants (13 female, Mean age = 23.6, range = 20–
39) was included in the analysis. Descriptive statistics from the
Libet task represent the latency between W-judgment and action
execution in milliseconds (this is a negative number as awareness
occurred before action onset in all participants), while percentage
scores were used for data from the heartbeat task and composite
scores were used to represent performance on the attributional
style questionnaire (see Table 1).
PREDICTION OF MEAN W-JUDGMENT FROM AS AND IS SCORES
A multiple regression was conducted to establish the relationship
between performance on the Libet task, heartbeat accuracy andAS
scores. The“MeanW-judgment”variable was used as the outcome
variable with the “Attributional Style” and “Heartbeat Accuracy”
variables acting as predictors. Predictor variables were entered
using the forced entry method due to the exploratory nature of
the research. Diagnostic tests did not reveal any violations of
the test statistics. Multi-collinearity between predictor variables
was not observed during diagnostic tests in the multiple regres-
sion (VIF = 1.22, Tolerance = 0.82) and normality was assumed.
The regression model was found to be signiﬁcant (R2 = 0.32,
F(2,22) = 5.08, p = 0.015) suggesting that the two predictor vari-
ables (“Heartbeat Accuracy” and “Attributional Style”) explained
31.6% of the variance (see Table 2). ASQ score was a signiﬁcant
predictor of mean W-judgment but heartbeat accuracy score was
not (see Figure 1).
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AS AND IS
A separate correlation was run to investigate the relation-
ship between “Attributional Style” and “Heartbeat Accuracy”. A
medium negative correlation was observed at a 2-tailed signiﬁ-
cance level, r(23) = −0.43, p = 0.034 (see Figure 2).
DISCUSSION
The results indicate that, while performance on the ASQ can
predict performance on the Libet task (consistent with our pre-
dictions), IS was not a signiﬁcant predictor of Libet performance,
contrary to our predictions. Speciﬁcally, more negative AS scores
correlate with more negative W-judgments (further away from
action onset). A signiﬁcant relationshipwas also observed between
AS score and IS.
Table 1 | Descriptive statistics forW-judgment, AS score and heartbeat
accuracy.
W-judgment
(ms)
ASQ (7-point
Likert)
Heartbeat
accuracy (%)
Mean (SD) −253ms (198 ms) 0.29 (1.06) 65.93 (15.84)
Min/Max −640/−30 −2.28/1.78 36.41/96.96
Values in parentheses indicate standard deviation.
Table 2 |The unstandardised (u) and standardized (s) beta coefficients
as predictors ofW-judgment.
Variables B (u) β (s) p
ASQ (SE) 0.115 (0.036) 0.617 0.004
Heartbeat accuracy (SE) 0.002 (0.002) 0.198 0.321
Values in parentheses represent the standard error. R2 = 0.32 (p = 0.015).
FIGURE 1 | Prediction of MeanW-judgment scores from attributional
style scores (AS Score), with linear regression (R2 = 0.32, p = 0.015).
FIGURE 2 |The relationship betweenAS Score and heartbeat accuracy
score (%; HBAccuracy), r = −0.43, p = 0.034.
Firstly, it is important to note that this research serves as a
replication of Libet et al. (1983) original ﬁndings in that the mean
W-judgment across the entire sample (M = −253 ms) was similar
to that of Libet’s sample (M = −206 ms). This is also consis-
tent with other replications of the Libet experiment for example,
Lau et al. (2004) reported a M = −228 ms while investigating
fMRI correlates of voluntary action and Rigoni et al. (2011) also
approximately replicate Libet’s ﬁndings while demonstrating that
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reducing belief in free will correlates with signiﬁcant reduction
in early RP amplitude, but not with a change in W-judgment
(Reduced belief group M = −242, Control group M = −223). As
our data is consistent with the literature, it is possible that individ-
ual differences in AS may have had undetected effects on previous
ﬁndings in the same way as the current research. The large vari-
ance of W-judgment values in the literature may be indicative of
these individual differences (i.e., Libet et al., 1983). Furthermore,
given the direction of the previous literature (for example, Libet
et al., 1983; Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008), it is safe to presume
that an overall average W-judgment of −253 ms will follow onset
of the RP by several hundred milliseconds.
More negativemean scores are indicative of a larger discrepancy
between W-judgment and action execution. This would suggest
that those with a more negative AS may be aware of the inten-
tion to act sooner than those with a positive AS. It may also be
that W-judgment accuracy is affected by these top-down person-
ality factors. This suggests that, even if criticisms surrounding the
paradigmwere addressed; such as those related to reliance on recall
of the urge to act, (for example, Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992),
personality variants may still affect awareness of the urge to act.
This research raises questions surrounding belief in free will –
i.e., that a larger veto period may relate to a pessimistic AS. It
may be that individuals with a more negative AS may perceive
themselves as having less control (and, therefore, less free will)
due to a disassociation between action awareness and action exe-
cution. Marcel (2003) argues that ownership of action can be
separated into ownership of action execution and ownership of
action intention. Therefore, a temporal dissociation between the
two may reduce the ownership one feels over action execution. In
turn, this may lead to a perceived lack of control as intention in
the individual’s schema is not bound to execution.
It is possible that those with a more pessimistic AS may be more
uncertain in the choices they make, as is consistent with research
into pessimistic AS (e.g., Bunce and Peterson, 1997; Boudreaux
and Ozer, 2013), while those with a more positive AS are more
likely to claim ownership over the action resulting in a smaller
latency between W-judgment and action onset. Therefore, the
pattern in the W-judgments may simply reﬂect level of self-doubt
and uncertainty in those with a negative AS. This theory is consis-
tent with research into negative AS and self-doubt (Heppner et al.,
1985; Bunce and Peterson, 1997).
It is most likely that the relationship observed between AS and
W-judgment is heavily inﬂuenced by aspects of internality (i.e.,
“is the cause of a life event due to the individual or to an exter-
nal factor?”). This was not assessed speciﬁcally because of the
desire to investigate the relationship between a more holistic rep-
resentation of perceived control and awareness of intention to
act. Furthermore, the poor subscale reliability of the ASQ meant
that this relationship was not explored in an additional analysis.
However, future research should also employ the LOC question-
naire to assess whether individuals with larger latency between
W-judgment and action execution have a more external LOC
independent of valence. Furthermore, research should investigate
whether those with a positiveAS will experience greater ownership
over their actions than those with a negative AS. To our knowl-
edge, this research is the ﬁrst to consider the possible negative
implications of having a longer “veto” period. Traditional litera-
ture into volition implicates the veto period in conscious control of
action (Libet, 1999; Mele, 2008), however, until now, no research
has investigated individual differences in the veto period. If the
above theory is true, it may be that a larger veto period (indicative
of greater control over one’s actions) correlates with reduced levels
of perceived control.
The regression analysis demonstrated that IS did not predict
awareness of conscious intention to act. However, the results indi-
cate a medium, negative correlation between IS and AS suggesting
that the more negative (or pessimistic) an individual’s AS, the bet-
ter they are at estimating their ownheartbeats. BothAS and IS have
been shown to correlate with anxiety (Domschke et al., 2010; Mark
and Smith, 2012). Therefore, the effect here may relate to a hyper-
awareness seen in those with anxiety disorders. It is also possible
that, due to the correlation with depressive symptoms (Seligman,
2002), those with a negative AS have a tendency to self-evaluate
and, therefore, are more self-aware. It is important to note that
researches into the correlates of IS are inconsistent, so more work
is still needed in the area (see der Does et al., 2000).
Future research should focus on furthering understanding of
individual differences in performance on the Libet task (and other
tasks related to awareness of conscious intention to act), and what
these differences relate to. More speciﬁcally, a causal relationship
betweenAS andW-judgment should be investigated by attempting
to manipulate AS (for example, see Anderson, 1983) score and, in
turn,modulate performance on the Libet task. This could establish
whether perceived control over positive and negative life events
may have a causal impact on awareness of conscious intention
to act. Manipulating AS score could also be used to investigate
a causal relationship between AS and IS. Further investigation
is required to uncover latent variables which may modulate the
relationships in question. These ﬁndings would be strengthened
by using EEG to investigate potential neural correlates, speciﬁcally
the LRP.
Implications of this research are potentially wide ranging;
speciﬁcally this research informs literature relating to agency,
action ownership and AS. Additionally, this research takes a
step toward understanding individual differences in awareness
of intention to act. More generally, this research suggests that
perceived control and volition are related.
In conclusion, it is clear that a relationship exists between per-
formance on the Libet task and performance on the ASQ. It is
possible therefore, that someof the variance in theLibet task results
from individual differences in top-down traits such as personality
variants. The current research highlights potential confounds in
the W-judgment related to ﬂuctuations in AS. Furthermore, this
research demonstrates that, those with a more negative AS may
have a larger latency between W-judgment and action onset. It
is proposed that this relationship may result from a discrepancy
between conscious awareness of the intention to move, and the
consequence of this (action onset) suggesting, for the ﬁrst time,
potential negative implications of a longer veto period.
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